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AND EXPERIENCE": THE SELECTIVE
WAIVER DOCTRINE AND PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
MICHELLE LAMBERT

INTRODUCTION

A trial requires the truth to meet the ends of justice.1 At the
same time, common law has created the law of privileges because
"society has valued the trust and confidentiality of certain
relationships enough to allow certain individuals the right to
refuse to offer testimony at trial. ' 2 Thus, the confidential nature
of privileged communications is in tension with the primary
truth-seeking goal of litigation. 3 Courts have addressed this
t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. I would like to thank Professor Vincent
Alexander for his much needed and appreciated guidance through the world of
attorney-client privilege.
1 See PAUL C. GIANELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 1.07 (2d ed. 2006); 8
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev.
1961). Trials in the federal court system are governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which state: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
2 Stacey A. Garber, Note, Cox v. Miller: The Clergy Privilege and Alcoholics
Anonymous, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 917, 917 (2003). Confidence has been considered
necessary for the existence of privileges. "'The moment confidence ceases,' said Lord
Eldon, 'privilege ceases."' 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599.
3 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1998) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("Testimonial
exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the
public.., has a right to every man's evidence.'" (quoting United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))); see also GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 562. Additionally,
the Federal Rules of Evidence allow for all relevant evidence to be admitted into
trial unless it is precluded by "the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EVID. 402. Relevant evidence is defined as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
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delicate balance by narrowly construing privileges to minimize
4
the exclusion of relevant evidence from judicial proceedings.
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the recognized
privileges.5 The privilege allows clients to communicate with
their attorneys with confidence that these communications will
not later be admissible in judicial proceedings. 6 In addition, the
attorney-client privilege also encompasses communications made
by corporate employees to the corporation's counsel under certain
circumstances. 7 Yet in either circumstance, the privilege is not
If the attorney or client later discloses a
indestructible.
to a third party, the privilege is waived
communication
privileged
and the communication is no longer protected from disclosure in
future litigation. 8
Lately, government investigative agencies have pressured
corporations to cooperate with ongoing investigations by
voluntarily turning over privileged communications to the
government. 9 As stated above, when corporations, like any other
clients, disclose privileged communications to government
agencies, which are third parties outside of the attorney-client
relationship, the corporations normally waive the privilege as to
any other future third party litigants.' 0
it would be without the evidence." Id. 401. Often times, privileged information that
is inadmissible in the fact-finding process would fit the definition of relevant
evidence. See GIANNELLI, supranote 1, at 13.
4 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (explaining that testimonial privileges should be
"strictly construed"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
5 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2290-91, at 542-45 (discussing the history of
attorney-client privilege from the Elizabethan era until present day).
6 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2327, at 634 ("The privilege is designed to secure the client's confidence in
").
the secrecy of his communications ....
7 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (holding that corporations could utilize the
attorney-client privilege). The Court also distinguished what types of
communications could be deemed privileged. See id. at 396.
8 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 567 n.41; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2327, at
634-38.
9 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the
Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys § VI (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines
.htm (advocating prosecutorial leniency for corporations who waive its attorneyclient privilege); Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., to
All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys § VI (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo],
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html
(discussing bringing criminal charges against corporations).
10 See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1201 (10th
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Surprisingly, not all jurisdictions treat a corporation's
disclosure of privileged communications to the government as
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. One circuit court of
appeals chose to depart from this bedrock principle of the
attorney-client privilege and has recognized the selective waiver
doctrine, which allows a corporation to disclose privileged
communications to the government while maintaining its
attorney-client privilege to any third party litigants in relation to
those disclosed communications. 1 More notably, all other circuit
courts of appeals faced with this issue have not recognized the
selective waiver doctrine because of its opposition to the
historically narrow and strict construction of the attorney-client
privilege.1 2 In addition, courts have gone so far as to suggest that
the selective waiver doctrine embodies a new privilege between
the government and corporations-not the corporations and their
attorneys. 13 Yet, even though the doctrine has been rejected by
most of the judiciary, a proposal for the adoption of a new
Federal Rule of Evidence, which includes the selective waiver
doctrine, has been approved by the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee and published for public comment.14
Due to the inconsistent purpose of the selective waiver
doctrine with the attorney-client privilege, the inclusion of the
selective waiver doctrine in proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
502 would create a new government-investigatory privilege and
would in effect be the first federal codification of a specific

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 584 (2006); In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp.

Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. MIT, 129
F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951
F.2d 1414, 1425-26 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting formation of new attorney-client
privilege created by selective waiver); John Doe Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d
482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
11 See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc); see also 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 494-507 (5th ed. 2007) (describing the circuit courts of

appeals' split over the selective waiver doctrine). The scope of this Note will not
cover selective waiver of the work-product and it should be noted that the state of
the common law of selective waiver of attorneys' work-product is different from that
of the attorney-client privilege. See 2 EPSTEIN, supra, at 1118.
12 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
13 See Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1197-98; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424-25.
14 See FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed Draft 2006), available at http:/!
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf; see also infra notes 122-30 and
accompanying text.
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privilege. 15 Part I of this Note will describe the attorney-client
privilege and also how the Federal Rules of Evidence presently
govern the law of privileges in federal judicial proceedings. Part
II will discuss the selective waiver doctrine and its current state
in the circuit courts of appeals. Part II will also introduce
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and its inclusion of the
selective waiver doctrine. Part III of this Note will propose that
the selective waiver doctrine embodies a new privilege separate
This will be
from that of the attorney-client privilege.
demonstrated by the selective waiver doctrine's distinctly
different purpose than that of the attorney-client privilege. In
doing so, Part III will highlight how the selective waiver doctrine
opposes the core principles of the attorney-client privilege.
Lastly, this Note will posit that as a new type of "governmentinvestigatory" privilege, selective waiver would not survive
judicial scrutiny. Therefore, any recognition of this privilege
would be an extreme divergence from the creation of other
privileges.
I.

THE JUDICIARY'S NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE FEDERAL RULES' DEFERENCE TO THE
COMMON LAW

A.

The RationalesBehind Privileged Communications

Two basic rationales support the exclusion of relevant and
reliable evidence deemed as "privileged."'1 6 First, Dean John
Henry Wigmore presented a utilitarian justification, known as
the instrumental theory, which assumes that the privilege is the
"but for" cause of the underlying relationship. 17 A second
rationale focuses on the concern for the privacy needed to foster

15At this time, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that common law governs
privileges. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
16 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 562-66 (comparing the instrumental
justification for privileges with the privacy rationale). Although it is beyond the
scope of this Note, the testimonial privilege is dwarfed by the attorney's ethical
obligation to maintain confidentiality of a client's confidences. See 1 EPSTEIN, supra
note 11, at 15--19; see also Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 286-94 (1989)
(discussing the ethical responsibilities of attorneys in relation to privileges).
17 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the
Foundationof Evidentiary Privileges,83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 317-18 (2003).
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certain types of relationships.' 8 Although both the instrumental
theory and the privacy rationale may be used to justify the same
privilege, the rationales separately address the need for
confidentiality in different types of relationships. 19
The instrumental theory is premised on the "behavioral
assumption" that a person would not enter into a consultant
relationship "but for the assurance of confidentiality furnished by
a formal evidentiary privilege." 20 Professor Wigmore defined four
fundamental conditions needed for a privileged communication
as the basis of his theory:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
21
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
In other words, this theory assumes that the average person
would be deterred from going to a consultant, such as an attorney
or a psychotherapist, without the protection of the evidentiary
privilege. 22 Thus, neither the relationship nor "the excluded
evidence would ...have come into existence without the
privilege." 23
Therefore, the privileged nature of the
communications places litigants in the same position they would
24
have been had there never been a privilege.
The second "privacy" rationale justifies the law of privileges
from a slightly different perspective. 25 "A liberal democratic
state should assure its citizens that they may enter into intimate
consultative relationships with minimal risk that their autonomy
18

333.

See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 565; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at

19 See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
20 Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 317.
21 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527; see also GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at
563 n.24.
22 Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 317.
23 Id. at 318.
24 See id. at 317-18; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,
408 (1998); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996) (explaining how without the
privilege the communications were probably "unlikely to come into being").
25 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 565-66; Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 333-

926

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:921

will be violated during the consultation." 26 Thus, privacy creates
a trusting relationship that allows a person to speak with their
consultant openly to obtain accurate, helpful advice. 27 With this
in mind, a person can be free to expose the facts in a
relationship-"warts-and-all" 2 8-in
order to facilitate open
communication and a "private enclave" relationship. 29 "The
individuals communicating within these enclaves must not only
have negative freedom from the molestation of their relationship,
but must also feel that they have an affirmative freedom to
engage in the intimate communication that is necessary to the
person's making intelligent, independent life preference
choices."30 Additionally, privacy allows the consultant to provide
31
proper advice without any societal motivations or pressures.
Each rationale justifies privileged communications for
different types of relationships. 32
Relationships where one
person seeks advice from another, such as attorney-client or
psychotherapist-patient, fit the instrumental theory due to the
fact that the privileged communications are the basis of the
relationship.3 3 Therefore, the relationship may never have been
formed for fear of exposure. In contrast, the spousal privilege
relies mainly on the privacy rationale because communications
made during a marriage are not the foundation of the marital
relationship.3 4 It can be easily said that the institution of
marriage would not cease in the absence of an evidentiary
privilege attached to spousal communications. 35 It should be
noted that most privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege,
36
could be justified by using either rationale.
26

Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 333.

27
29

See id.
Id. at 336.
See id. at 335.

30

Id.

28

See id. at 336-37 (explaining how the consultant can only provide unfettered
advice under the cloak of privacy).
32 See id. at 329-33 (describing the different relationships that are typically
formed in society and their justifications).
33 See id. at 333; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 40708 (1998) (basing the formation of the relationship on the existence of the privilege).
34 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 601-02.
35 See id.
36 See Alexander, supra note 16, at 219.
There is no reason why instrumental and noninstrumental rationales must
be viewed as mutually exclusive; it is perhaps a matter of emphasis. For
example, the instrumental argument is bolstered if consideration is given
31
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The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the confidential
communication privileges.3 7 The privilege dates back to the reign
of Elizabeth I in England. 38 Professor Wigmore defined the
attorney-client privilege as:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
39
the protection be waived.
In sum, there must be a confidential communication made
between privileged parties "for the purpose of seeking, obtaining,
40
or providing legal assistance to the client."
Both communications by the client and the attorney are
protected by the privilege. 4 1 The attorney-client privilege is
absolute and shields the attorney and client from being
compelled to disclose relevant privileged communications in
judicial proceedings. 42 As a result, courts construe the privilege
narrowly and strictly apply certain parameters. 4 3 The Supreme
to the notion that the protection of privacy and autonomy is another social
benefit fostered by the privilege. The privacy argument, in turn, may
require some degree of utilitarian analysis to justify extension of an
evidentiary privilege to the attorney-client relationship while denying it to
other relationships that are more intimate in nature.
Id.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542.
See id. at 542-43. Originally, the attorney-client privilege was upheld as a
matter of honor, rather than to bolster the attorney-client relationship. See id. at
543.
39 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554. A simplified version of this
definition provides four essential elements: "(1) A communication; (2) made between
privileged persons; (3) in confidence; (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or
providing legal assistance to the client." 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 65.
40 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 65.
41 See Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated
Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 385-86
(2005).
42 See Janet L. Hall, Limited Waiver of Protection Afforded by the AttorneyClient Privilegeand the Work-Product Doctrine, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 981, 985 (1993).
43 See id. at 985. "[W]e construe the scope of privileges narrowly. We are
reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an existing one expansively unless to do so
will serve a 'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.'" Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 524 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1998) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
37
38
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Court has utilized the instrumental theory to justify the privilege
by emphasizing "without the privilege, the client may not have
44
made such communications in the first place."
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,45 the Supreme Court
recognized a corporate attorney-client privilege while also
46
clarifying the overall purpose of the attorney-client privilege.
"Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice." 47 While the Court refused to set specific rules for the
privilege in the context of corporations, 48 it held that
communications made by lower level employees to the company's
49
counsel were protected under the privilege.
At the same time, the Court reiterated that only disclosures
50
of communications, not the "underlying facts," were protected.
The Court described how a "'client cannot be compelled to
answer the question, 'What did you say or write to the attorney?'
but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of fact
into his communication to his attorney.'-51 Consequently, the
privilege did not "immunize" the facts from being revealed by
some means other than the privileged communication. 52
This demonstrates that the attorney-client privilege does not
automatically attach to every communication made between the
attorney and the client. 53 The privilege only belongs to the
client 54 and must be affirmatively raised either by the client or on
the client's behalf.55 Certain information communicated during
the relationship ordinarily does not constitute "privileged"
44 Swidler, 524 U.S. at 408.
45 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
46

See id. at 389-90.

47 Id. at 389.
48 See id. at 396 ("Any such approach would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of

Evidence 501.").
49 Id. at 397.
50 Id. at 395-96.
51 Id. at 396 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp.
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
52 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d
1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he privilege does not impede disclosure of information
except to the extent that the disclosure would reveal confidential communications.").
53 See 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 66-86; see also supra note 51.
54 See Richmond, supra note 41, at 386.
55 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 19.
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communications. 56 Examples of non-privileged information are
the fact that the relationship exists, the client's purpose for
hiring the attorney, and fee or billing arrangements. 57 Other
communications fall within "exceptions" to the attorney-client
privilege. 58 An exception nullifies the protection of the privilege
although each element of the attorney-client privilege may be
present because of reasons such as public policy concerns. 59
Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege include a fiduciary
exception, 60 crime or fraud exception, 6 1 and attorney-client
62
dispute exception.
As stated by Professor Wigmore, confidentiality provides the
backbone for the attorney-client privilege. 63 This statement is
true when using either the instrumental theory or the privacy
rationale to justify the privilege. 64 Confidentiality supports the
policy of enabling free communication between the client and
attorney, which aids both the establishment and growth of the
relationship. 65 Thus, the attorney-client privilege may be later
waived or destroyed by the loss of the necessary element of
confidentiality. 66 This can be done by (1) either the client or
56 See id. at 88-133 (providing examples of communications "not encompassed
within the privilege").
57 See id. at 88-103 (outlining examples of non-privileged information).
58 See id. at 637 ("The courts have recognized certain contexts in which the
attorney-clienft privilege might be expected to exist but can be invaded by other

interested parties.").
59 Id.
60 See

id. at 638-39 (defining the Garner Doctrine as the court's recognition of a
company's shareholders' ability to "pierce" the company's privilege in corporate
derivative actions).
61 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989) (explaining that the
attorney-client privilege does not encompass communications between attorney and
client regarding future criminal acts); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933);
In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2298, at 572 ("It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege
cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime ... ").
62 See 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 552-65 (discussing an attorney's ability to
breach the attorney-client privilege in attorney self-defense and compensation
claims against the client).
63 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599; see also Nancy Horton Burke,
The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver of Attorney-Client
and Work Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 37 (1997) ("Confidentiality is
the key element of the attorney-client privilege ... ").
64 See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
65 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545; Burke, supra note 63, at 36-37.
66 See 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 390. The following examples constitute
waiver: purposeful disclosure, partial disclosure, compelled disclosure, failure to

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:921

attorney testifying as to the communication, (2) putting the
communication into issue in litigation, (3) voluntary disclosure to
a third party, or (4) inadvertent waiver.6 7 Additionally, the
presence of third parties at the time of the communication
generally destroys the privilege ab initio.6 8
For example,
communications between attorney and client in a crowded room
are not confidential as to the third parties in the room; thus, the
privilege never applies to those communications. 69 Therefore, the
privilege can only be maintained if the communication is
confidential and the attorney and the client maintain that
confidentiality.
C.

FederalRule of Evidence 501

In 1975, Congress adopted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 70 Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by courts of the United
71
States in the light of reason and experience.

This general rule left privileges in the domain of the common law
to be governed by court interpretations based on "reason and
experience." 72

0

Originally, the Supreme Court proposed thirteen specific
rules of privilege.7 3 These privileges included a general rule of
object to disclosure, accidental disclosure by the client, and inadvertent disclosure.
See id. at 398-470.
67 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 588-91.
68 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 601-03. An exception to this rule
allows third parties, such as secretaries or paralegals, to be involved in aiding the
litigation without destroying the privilege. See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 578.
69 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 578. However, eavesdroppers do not destroy
the privilege. Id. at 578-79.
70 David P. Leonard, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: Introduction, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 515, 515 (2004).
71 FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
72 See id; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
73 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 559; Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in
the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New Privileges,35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255,
273 (2005); Leonard, supra note 70, at 515 ("Thirty years after the adoption of the
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privilege, nine specific privileges, and three procedural rules of
privilege. 74 The Supreme Court's proposed rules of privilege
almost halted the codification of the entire Federal Rules of
Evidence and were quite controversial. 75 Concerned that the
Court's proposed rules of privilege lacked flexibility, 76 Congress
directed the Court to create one common law rule. 77 As a result,
Rule 501 was created to allow for flexibility within the judiciary
by examining each privilege on a case-by-case basis, thus
avoiding future "freezing" of the laws of privilege into one
78
formation.
II. THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE AND ITS PRECARIOUS
EXISTENCE

A.

The Selective Waiver Cases

Generally, voluntary disclosure of privileged communications
to a third party outside of the attorney-client relationship waives
the attorney-client privilege. 79 The selective waiver doctrine acts
as an exception to this rule of waiver by allowing voluntary
disclosure of privileged communications by clients to government
investigatory agencies, while maintaining the privilege as to
Federal Rules of Evidence, privileges remain uncodified.").
74 GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 559. The proposed specific privilege rules
included "required reports" (502); attorney-client (503); psychotherapist-patient
(504); husband-wife (505); clergy-penitent (506); political vote (507); trade secrets
(508); state secrets (509); and informant's privilege (510). Id. n.4. For a further
discussion about the Supreme Court's 1972 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, see
generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An
Alternative to the Proposed FederalRules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1974).
75 GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 559-60. The controversy delayed enactment of
the Rules for two years. Id. at 559; see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics
of [Evidence] Rulemaking," 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 854 (2002) (describing the
proposed rules of privilege as "the subject of intense lobbying").
76 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 560; Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 126 (1974)
("Congress believed that an evidence code would affect fundamental matters of civil
and criminal justice that reach beyond technical courtroom conduct and into the
lives of citizens.").
77 See GIANNELLI, supra note 1, at 560; Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, The
Federal Common Law of Journalists'Privilege:
A Position Paper,60 THE REC. (N.Y.
City Bar) 214, 215 (2005) (explaining how Congress found the draft rules to "limit
the flexibility of the courts").
78 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); see also Lauderdale, supra
note 73, at 258.
79 See supra notes 66-69.
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other non-government third parties.80 The utilization of this
doctrine by corporations that turn documents over to government
81
agencies has caused a split in the circuit courts of appeals.
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith
In 1978, the Eighth Circuit became the only circuit court of
appeals to recognize the selective waiver doctrine in Diversified
Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.8 2 After deciding that a report
prepared by attorneys for Diversified Industries, Inc.
("Diversified") regarding a proxy fight litigation was protected
under the attorney-client privilege,8 3 the court tackled the
question of whether the company waived this privilege by
voluntarily providing the privileged document to the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to an agency
subpoena.8 4 The court concluded that Diversified's disclosure
was only a "limited waiver" because the SEC's investigation was
"separate and nonpublic."8 5 The court stated, "To hold otherwise
may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to
investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,
potential stockholders and customers."8 6 The court attempted to
minimize the effect of allowing Diversified to maintain its
attorney-client privilege as to the documents it disclosed to the
SEC by noting that third party litigants would still be able to
87
obtain the same information through other means.
In Diversified, the Eighth Circuit did not analyze the effect
of the selective waiver doctrine on the attorney-client privilege or
compare the doctrine to the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege.8 8
Instead, the court based its acceptance of the
1.

80 See 1 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 495.
81 See infra notes 82-122 and accompanying text.
82 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
83 See
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See

id. at 611.

id. The court stated that litigants would still have other means available
to obtain the same information, such as "examine business documents, depose
corporate employees and interview nonemployees, obtain preexisting documents and
financial records not prepared by Diversified for the purpose of communications with
the law firm in confidence." Id.
88 The court briefly addressed the issue of whether this constituted a waiver as
to other third parties in two short paragraphs. See id.

2007]

SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE

selective waiver doctrine on public policy concerns regarding the
importance of cooperation by companies during government
investigations.8 9 Since Diversified, every other circuit court faced
with the issue of whether to recognize the selective waiver
doctrine has rejected the doctrine and its public policy
justification. 90
2.

In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation
The Sixth Circuit provided the most complete analysis of the
selective waiver doctrine in In re Columbia/Healthcare Corp.
Billing Practices Litigation.9 1 In that case, Columbia/HCA
challenged a district court's order to produce documents that it
had previously disclosed during a Department of Justice ("DOJ")
investigation by claiming the attorney-client privilege. 92 After
performing an internal audit, Columbia/HCA agreed to disclose
these documents to the DOJ in accordance with a strict
confidentiality agreement that would maintain the privileged
nature of the documents. 93 As a result of the investigation,
89 See id.
90 See infra notes 105, 107-13 and accompanying text.
91 293 F.3d 289, 295-04 (6th Cir. 2002). In addition to the Sixth Circuit, every

other circuit confronted with the selective waiver doctrine has rejected it. See In re
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006); In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir.
2002); United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425-26 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting
formation of new privilege created by selective waiver); In re John Doe Corp., 675
F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
92 See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 293. The DOJ had previously investigated
Columbia/HCA for Medicare and Medicaid fraud. Id. at 291. As a result of Columbia/
HCA's knowledge of the pending investigation, the company performed an internal
audit of its billing practices. Id. at 291-92. Initially, when the DOJ requested copies
of the internal audit, Columbia/HCA denied the request claiming both attorneyclient privilege and work-product doctrine. Id. at 292.
93 See id. The agreement stated:
[T]he disclosure of any report, document, or information by one party to the
other does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or claim ....
Both parties to the agreement reserve the right to contest the assertion of
any privilege by the other party to the agreement, but will not argue that
the disclosing party, by virtue of the disclosures it makes pursuant to this
agreement, has waived any applicable privilege or work product doctrine
claim.
Id. In addition, the agreement allowed the DOJ to transfer any information to other
government agencies or congressional committees. See id. n.2. Therefore, if the
investigation had revealed any wrongdoing on the part of Columbia/HCA,
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Columbia/HCA settled with the DOJ and paid a fine for
94
overcharging Medicare via miscoding of Medicare patients.
Once the settlement became public, private insurance
companies initiated litigation against Columbia/HCA claiming
that the company had also overcharged them. 95 The litigants
demanded access to the audit report that had been disclosed to
the DOJ. 96 ColumbiaIHCA claimed attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine to preclude disclosure as to those
litigants. 97 Relying on Diversified, the company argued that
98
disclosure to the government did not waive the privilege.
Additionally, Columbia/HCA argued that its confidentiality
agreement with the DOJ precluded disclosure. 99 The district
court rejected these arguments and followed other circuits' strict
construction of the attorney-client privilege. 10 0 Columbia/HCA
appealed the district court's opinion that any third party
disclosure of privileged documents waived that privilege. 10 1
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's rejection of the
selective waiver doctrine. 10 2 After sifting through the "state of
'hopeless confusion' "103 of case law on this issue, the court found
that other courts had adopted three positions on the selective
waiver doctrine. First, some lower courts followed Diversified
and found the selective waiver doctrine permissible.' 0 4 Second,
other courts held the doctrine as never permissible. 10 5 Finally,
prosecution of the illegal action would have included the documents in question.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96

at 292.

See id. at 293.

97 See id.

See id.
99See id.
98

10 See id.
101 See id.

Id. at 291.
Id. at 295.
104 See id. at 299. The court discussed the Eighth Circuit in Diversified as the
only circuit court holding the selective waiver doctrine wholly permissible. The Sixth
Circuit then cited district courts that followed Diversified in the name of advancing
the public's interest in corporate cooperation with government investigations. See id.
As a side note, the court also alluded to the fact that in a later decision, the Eighth
Circuit questioned its decision in Diversified, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Subpoena, 841 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1988). See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 298
n.15. The Sixth Circuit quoted the Eighth Circuit in Grand Jury Proceedings as
stating: "[Voluntary disclosure is inconsistent with the confidential attorney-client
relationship and waives the privilege .... Id.
105 See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d. at 295. The court's discussion focused on
102

103
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courts have held that the selective waiver doctrine is permissible
when the third party is the government and disclosure is made
pursuant to an agreed upon confidentiality order.106
After a careful analysis of all three positions, the Sixth
08
10 7
Circuit joined the District of Columbia Circuit, First Circuit,
1
11
0
1
0
9
Fourth Circuit,' ' and the
Third Circuit,
Second Circuit,
1
2
in rejecting the selective waiver doctrine in all
Federal Circuit
circumstances.'1 3 Utilizing the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege provided by the Supreme Court in Upjohn, the court
found that the doctrine failed to aid the "fostering [of] frank
communication between a client and his or her attorney."'1 4 The
court stated that the selective waiver doctrine merely encouraged
disclosure of privileged communications to the government that
other circuit courts' findings that the selective waiver doctrine had no connection
with the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, thereby extending the privilege
beyond its intended purpose. See id. at 297. Additionally, courts found this to allow
companies to "pick and choose" among those to whom they want to disclose. Id. at
296. Courts also rejected Diversified's basis that companies needed incentive to
disclose privileged documents. See id. at 297. (" '[A] third party ... has an incentive
to do so, whether for gain or to avoid disadvantage.' ").
106 See id. at 299-302. Some courts have allowed the non-waiver of privileged
documents after disclosure to government agencies only if the disclosure was
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. See id.
107 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
D.C. Circuit found that even with a confidentiality agreement, the selective waiver
doctrine had "little to do with this confidential link between the client and his legal
advisor." Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 296 (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21).
In Permian, the court found that the selective waiver doctrine allows clients to "pick
and choose" who the privilege can be used against and "as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit." Id.
108United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997). The First Circuit
found that there would be no logical stopping point for courts applying the selective
waiver doctrine. See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 297-98 (citing MIT, 129 F.3d at
686).
109In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Columbia/
HCA, 293 F.3d at 296 n.9.
1i0 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d
Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege would be
extended beyond its original purpose of "encouraging full disclosure" between client
and attorney. Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 297 (quoting Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at
1425).
-ii In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
112Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
113Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302. Since this decision, the Tenth Circuit has
also rejected the selective waiver doctrine in In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec.
Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006).
114Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302.
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had already been communicated between the client and the
attorney. 1 5 Thus, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
had been fulfilled prior to the disclosure of privileged
communications to the government." 6 Additionally, the court
reasoned that the use of the selective waiver doctrine could turn
the attorney-client privilege into a strategic weapon for the
117
client's use.
The court also dismissed the idea of confidentiality
8
agreements as a means to uphold the selective waiver doctrine."1
The attorney-client privilege "is not a creature of contract,
arranged between parties to suit the whim of the moment."" 19
The rejection of the use of confidentiality agreements allowed the
court to provide litigants with "certainty," which would have been
an impossibility if the court was asked to "line draw" which
disclosures were and were not privileged in different
circumstances. 120 Included in its reasoning, the court questioned
the integrity of the government when entering into
confidentiality agreements with corporations that could "assist
wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public
domain."' 2 ' The court explained, "The investigatory agencies of
the Government should act to bring to light illegal activities, not
to assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the
public domain."'122 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit, like most other
circuit courts of appeals, rejected the selective waiver doctrine in
any form.

115

See id. at 302-03.

116 See id. ("Nowhere amongst these reasons is the ability to 'talk candidly with
the Government.' ").
117 See id.
The court additionally maintained that "any form of selective
waiver... transforms the attorney-client privilege into 'merely another brush on an
attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage.'"
Id. at 302 (quoting Steinhardt Partners v. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
118 See id. at 302-03. The court analyzed decisions by lower courts and dicta
from the Second Circuit that allowed the selective waiver doctrine when the
government and the client had a confidentiality agreement as to other third parties
prior to the disclosure of privileged communications. See id. at 299-302.

121

Id. at 303.
See id. at 304.
Id. at 303.

122

Id.

119
120

20071

SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE

B.

ProposedFederalRule of Evidence 502
In the wake of the uncertainty created by the state of the
selective waiver doctrine in the judicial system, the Standing
Committee on the Supreme Court's Judicial Conference approved
for publication and comments Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
502 in June of 2006.123 If approved, Rule 502 would codify the
selective waiver doctrine for federal actions. 124 The section on
"selective waiver" in proposed Rule 502 states:
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication
or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work
product protection-when made to a federal public office or
agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement authority-does not operate as a waiver of the
privilege or protection in favor of non-governmental persons or
entities. The effect of disclosure to a state or local government
agency, with respect to non-governmental persons or entities, is
governed by applicable state law. Nothing in this rule limits or
expands the authority of a government agency to disclose
communications or information to other government agencies or
125
as otherwise authorized or required by law.
The committee notes outlined the overall purpose of Rule 502 as
(1) a resolution of splits among the courts and (2) a tool in the
126
reduction of the cost of litigation.
Although the committee admitted that most courts have
rejected the selective waiver doctrine, it expressly cited the
public policy rationale relied upon by the Eighth Circuit in
Diversified and the dissent in Columbia/HCA to support the
inclusion of the selective waiver doctrine in Rule 502.127 The
advisory committee's notes were silent as to how the selective

123 See Memorandum from Hon. Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure 3 (rev. June 30, 2006) [hereinafter Smith Memo], http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/ExcerptEVReportYPub.pdf.
124 See FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed Draft 2006), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/ExcerpLEV_.ReportPub.pdf.
125 Id. Although this section was provided for public comment and approved by
the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee in April of 2006, the actual
text of this selection was placed within brackets to demonstrate that the committee
has not decided as of yet whether this section will be sent to Congress. Id. All rules
regarding privileges must be enacted by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000).
126 Smith Memo, supra note 123, at 8 (Advisory Committee Note). Specifically,
the selective waiver provision was included because of the dispute in the courts.
127 See id.
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waiver doctrine related to the attorney-client privilege and its
purpose. 128 Instead, the committee's explanation for inclusion of
the doctrine focused on the public policy concerns of private
entities cooperating with the government. 129 "A rule protecting
selective waiver in these circumstances furthers the important
policy of cooperation with government agencies, and maximizes
' 130
the effectiveness and efficiency of government investigations."
The committee also rejected inclusion of the need for
confidentiality agreements between corporations and the
government due to the possibility of additional litigation over the
sufficiency of the agreements. 131 Therefore, the reasoning for the
inclusion of selective waiver in Proposed Rule 502 mirrors the
Eighth Circuit's "public policy" rationale, which stands alone
among all of the other circuit courts' decisions rejecting the
selective waiver doctrine.
III. THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE AND THE CREATION OF A
NEW AND UNJUSTIFIABLE PRIVILEGE

A.

A New Government-InvestigatoryPrivilege Cloaked as the
Selective Waiver Doctrine

Courts have correctly proposed that the divergence in
purposes behind the attorney-client privilege and selective
waiver doctrine creates a new privilege, a governmentinvestigatory privilege, rather than a mere exception or
132
modification to the long-standing attorney-client privilege.
The selective waiver doctrine encompasses more than an
exception to the waiver rule of the attorney-client privilege. The
attorney-client privilege's purpose has been defined as the
promotion of open and frank conversation between the attorney
and client. 133 This facilitates the private relationship between
the attorney and client that will serve the public's interest by

See id.
See id.
130 Id. (citing In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 314 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
131 Id.
132 See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, (10th Cir.
2006); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1424-26 (3d
Cir. 1991).
133 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
128

129
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creating a just legal system. 134 Yet on the other end of the
spectrum, the selective waiver doctrine's purpose is purely based
on the public's need for cooperation between corporations and the
government. 135 This does not take into account the private
relationship of the attorney and client, but rather this purpose
only focuses on the government and client, which is a different
relationship altogether from the attorney-client privilege's
purpose.
Neither the same instrumental theory nor the privacy
rationale that supports the attorney-client privilege can also

The Supreme Court
justify the selective waiver doctrine.
the attorney-client
for
justification
an
instrumental
recognized
136
would never have
the
client
The Court reasoned that
privilege.
disclosed the privileged communications to the attorney in the
first place without the knowledge of the existence of the attorneyclient privilege. 137 Alternatively, if utilizing the privacy rationale
to justify the attorney-client privilege, the trusting and open
relationship between the attorney and client fosters the existence
Quite plainly, both the
of a privileged communication. 138
instrumental theory and privacy rationale are based on the
creation or growth of "full and frank" communications between
the attorney and client. 139 However, disclosure of information to
the government by the client "has little to do with" the open
and frank conversation justification for the attorney-client
140
privilege.
134 See id. ("The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully
informed by the client.")
135 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
137 See discussion on instrumental theory supra notes 20-24 and accompanying

text.
138 See discussion on privacy supra notes 25-31. It is important to realize that
neither justification need be exclusively used.
139 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
140 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981). It
is interesting to compare this with the fact that "exceptions" to the attorney-client
privilege lose the protection of the privilege due to their adverse purpose from the
attorney-client privilege. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. "Whereas
confidentiality of communications and work product facilitates the rendering of
sound legal advice, advice in furtherance of a fraudulent or unlawful goal cannot be
considered 'sound.'" In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15,
1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093, 1102-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (likening the shareholder doctrine to the crime-fraud
exception and joint representation exception).
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First, the selective waiver doctrine has no effect on the
initial conversation between attorney and client.1 41 In reality,
the client would have already openly and frankly communicated
with the attorney prior to disclosure of any information to the
government. 42 "If clients themselves divulge such information to
third parties, chances are that they would also have divulged it
to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege.
Thus, once a client has revealed privileged information to a
third party, the basic justification for the privilege no longer
applies . ...143 Therefore, the selective waiver doctrine only
applies after the client has openly and frankly discussed the
matter with the attorney. Thus, the attorney-client privilege and
the selective waiver doctrine cannot be justified on the same
grounds.
Additionally, the selective waiver doctrine is not like other
"exceptions" to the general rule that disclosure to a third party
waives the attorney-client privilege. 144 Other exceptions "are
consistent with the goal underlying the privilege because each
type of disclosure is sometimes necessary for the client to obtain
informed legal advice." 14 5 Examples of these "exceptions" are the
presence of interpreters, secretaries, or paralegals during
In
communications between the attorney and the client.' 46
contrast, the government is in no way a necessary third party for
the client to obtain legal advice or the attorney to render legal
advice. 147 Therefore, selective waiver fails to qualify as an
141 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425
(3d Cir. 1991).
142 See id. at 1424.
143

Id.

144

"The generally recognized exceptions already in place tend to serve the
particular privilege or protection. When disclosure is necessary to
consultation or assist with the representation, as in the case of
translator, or secretary, an exception to waiver preserves the
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th

purposes of the
accomplish the
an interpreter,
privilege." In re
Cir. 2006).
145 Id.
146 Id.

147 All of the corporations involved in litigation over the issue have already
provided the government with privileged documents without the known protection of
the selective waiver doctrine.
The record before us, however, does not support the contention that
companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent protection
under the selective waiver doctrine. Most telling is Qwest's disclosure of
220,000 pages of protected materials.., in the face of almost unanimous
circuit-court rejection of selective waiver ....
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exception to the third party general waiver rule because the
selective waiver doctrine's promotion of allowing the government
"in" on the communication does not further the privilege's
purpose of "open and frank" communication.
In fact, the doctrine could even undermine the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege by inhibiting communication between
the attorney and client. This may happen when an employee of
the client does not divulge information because he or she knows
that the employer has no further risk of third party liability due
to the disclosed privileged communications whereas the employee
still may be at risk, thus, creating a divide between the concerns
of the employee and the employer.' 48 Additionally, even though
the selective waiver doctrine will allow corporations to maintain
their privilege as to third parties, it will not protect them from
149
the government passing documents from agency to agency.
With this knowledge on hand, further inhibition of the corporate
attorney-client relationship may occur.150
The doctrine may be masked as a simple exception to the
rule of waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but in fact, the
doctrine creates a new privilege between the government and
corporations.1 5 1 The purpose of the selective waiver doctrine goes
beyond the intended purpose of the attorney-client privilege and
does not model any prior justifications or exceptions to the
waiver rule of the privilege. 15 2 Therefore, the selective waiver
doctrine in effect creates a new government-investigatory
53
privilege.
Id. at 1193.
148 See id. at 1195.
149 See FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed Draft 2006) available at http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
150 "In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation
confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals,
,constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,' particularly since
compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter." Elizabeth
Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1726-27
(2005) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)).
151 See Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1197; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991).
152 Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. "Westinghouse argues that the selective
waiver rule encourages corporations to conduct internal investigations and to
cooperate with federal investigative agencies .... In our view, to go beyond the
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege on the rationale offered by
Westinghouse would be to create an entirely new privilege." Id.
153 See Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1198 (rejecting formation of new "government-
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A Government-InvestigatoryPrivilege Lacks Justification

The selective waiver doctrine cannot stand as a separate
government-investigatory privilege. It cannot be justified by
either the instrumental theory or the privacy rationale. 154 The
instrumental theory relies on a "but-for" causation between the
privilege and the ensuing relationship. 155 Yet, a relationship
between a corporation and the government is not necessarily
based on the existence of the privilege. 156 In fact, the government
inserts itself daily into the practices of corporations by other
means and has created agencies such as the SEC
for this purpose. 157
Therefore, the government's present
involvement with corporations already creates a type of
relationship that does not need the judicial aid of a privilege.
In addition, the privacy rationale cannot support a
government-investigatory privilege.1 58
Corporations do not
need privacy to "consult" with the government because
the corporations regularly comply with requests from the
government. 159 Furthermore, the government does not have the
societal fear of sanctions or public outcry due to its "advice" given
to any corporation.1 60 In fact, the government's necessity of
"privacy" from the public would oppose the very public
foundation the government is built upon. 161 Therefore, the
privacy argument must also fail.
Some argue that the selective waiver doctrine would promote
further cooperation by corporations with the government,
thereby creating an even more "open" relationship.162 This
investigation privilege").
155

See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

156

See Holder Memo, supra note 9, § VI.

154

The very existence of certain government agencies, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, provides proof that corporations have very little choice
in forming a relationship with the government. See Jody E. Okrzesik, Note, Selective
Waiver: Should the Government be Privy to Privileged Information Without Waiving
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115,
159-62 (2003) (discussing government interaction with corporations through
agencies and legislation).
158 See supra notes 25-33, 35-36 and accompanying text.
159 See supra text accompanying note 27.
160 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
161 The U.S. government is a representative of 'its citizens. The U.S.
Constitution begins with the phrase "We the People" as a symbol of the people's
power in government.
162 See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192-93
157
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argument lacks reason. First, it bases a doctrine cloaked as an
exception to the waiver rule of the attorney-client privilege on the
government-corporation relationship rather than the attorneyclient. Second, it ignores the fact that corporations currently
provide thousands of privileged documents to the government
with prior knowledge that they are waiving the privilege as to
those documents. 16 3
Due to government incentives for
cooperation by private entities, corporations seek to cooperate
with the government. 164 Although some may view this as
"involuntary cooperation,"1 65 the selective waiver doctrine is not a
viable alternative. The government should not be allowed to aid
the cover-up of possibly criminal or civil wrongdoing by
corporations via use of a government-investigatory privilege that
166
could lead other litigants to justice.
In addition, a government-investigatory privilege would fail
the same judicial scrutiny used to examine new privileges. In
Jaffee v. Redmond, 67 the Supreme Court analyzed the elements
required to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege as
a new privilege. 168
The Court stated that the relationship
between the psychotherapist and patient depended upon trust
and confidentiality. 169 In contrast, a government-investigatory
(10th Cir. 2006).
163 See supra note 147.
164 The DOJ
instituted a policy that allows prosecutors to consider the
cooperation by the corporations and their voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing when
charging a corporation. See Thompson Memo, supra note 9, § VI. Specifically,
corporations could be granted "immunity or amnesty or pretrial diversion." Id. "One

factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of
the attorney-client and work product protections ....
" Id. Although the DOJ
considered this a "critical" component of assessing a corporation's voluntary
disclosure, the waiver of protection was not considered an absolute requirement, but
only one assessment factor. See id; see also Holder Memo, supra note 9, § VI.
165 See Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need for a New Look at
Selective Waiver in SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761, 783-84 (2006) ("[F]or
men and women facing the threat of imprisonment, the effective end of their
professional careers and financial well-being, and the weight of lining up against the
United States Government, it is not much of a choice."); Okrzesik, supra note 157, at
160 (describing corporations as being placed in a "thorny dilemma" by the Holder
Memo).
166 In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
303 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that the government should not "assist wrongdoers in
concealing the information from the public domain").
167 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
168 See id. at 18.
169 See id. at 10.
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privilege would hardly instill trust in a relationship between the
government and corporations. Since the government would not
be prevented from prosecuting corporations because of their
disclosed criminal wrongdoings, a remarkably reduced level of
"trust" would occur in a government-corporation relationship
170
than like the psychotherapist-patient relationship in Jaffee.
The decision in Jaffee also focused on the evidentiary benefit
lost as to third parties if the psychotherapist-patient privilege
were to be invoked.171
The Court found that "the likely
evidentiary benefit [to the public] that would result from the
denial of the privilege is modest." 172 Conversely, the denial of a
government-investigatory privilege would probably have little
effect on "the likely evidentiary benefit" it could provide the
government due to the amount of information already accessible
173
to the government.
In addition, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
enacted legislation pertaining to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege at the time the Court decided Jaffee. 174 The Court
found this significant in supporting the recognition of the new
privilege. 175 Yet as of June of 2006, a government investigatory
privilege or selective waiver doctrine lacked any similar type of
legislative recognition. 176 "As a practical matter, clients and
attorneys who disclose confidential information to government
agencies in adversarial roles should expect that their disclosures
waive the attorney-client
privilege and work product
immunity." 177
Therefore, the selective waiver doctrine or
government-investigatory privilege also lacks this essential
element of Jaffee.

170
171
172

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
Id. People may not seek help for fear of being exposed to the public. The

benefit of people receiving psychological help was found to far outweigh the
instances where the information would be necessary in a trial.
173 See supra note 144.
174 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
175 See id. at 12-13 ('Ve have previously observed that the policy decisions of

the States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one.").
176 See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1198-99 &
n.8 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the lack of legislation supporting a new governmentinvestigatory privilege).
177 Richmond, supra note 41, at 412.
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In the context of the government-investigatory privilege, the
focus should remain on the fairness of allowing the government
access to privileged documents while denying other third party
litigants the same evidentiary benefit. 178 The Eighth Circuit in
Diversified did not explain why the government should be treated
differently than the ordinary, private litigant.17 9 The court only
stated that the selective waiver doctrine promotes cooperation by
corporations with government investigations, thereby creating a
potential loss of information useful for investigations.1 8 0 Reasons
for the selective waiver doctrine, including the increase in
efficiency of investigations1 8 1 and the decrease in costs to the
government,18 2 fail to provide a reason for the disparate
18 3
treatment of the private litigant from the government.
The fairness of a government-investigatory privilege also
comes into question because of the difference in results between
Although
private litigation and government prosecutions.
criminal sanctions may be imposed on companies or its officers
by the government, losses to investors or employees cannot be
recouped in this manner.18 4 Instead, private litigants must use
civil litigation to gain back any of their losses. It has been noted:
"In these circumstances, civil litigation is by any objective
measure 'more important' than an associated government
inquiry. As for subjective considerations, such as deterrence,
large judgments and settlements in civil cases deter other
potential offenders just as well as regulatory penalties or
85
criminal fines."'
A government-investigatory privilege would also unfairly
deny private litigants access to privileged documents previously

178 See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84
MICH.L. REV. 1605, 1638-40 (1986).
179 See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).

180

See id.

181 Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-

Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 731-32 (2006).
182 See id. at 741.
183 See Richmond, supra note 41, at 411 (noting that the selective waiver
doctrine cannot be justified on the ground that "government investigations are
'generally more important' than civil litigation arising out of the same set of facts").
184 See id. at 411-12 (noting that while the government may extract a large fine
from the corporation, such a fine does nothing to lessen the financial harm to the
corporation's investors and employees).
185 Id. at 412.
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disclosed to the government.1 8 6 Proponents of the selective
waiver doctrine, however, have argued that if the documents had
not been disclosed, then the litigant would not have had access to
the documents anyway.18 7 Arguably, this is why the courts so
infrequently recognize new privileges and abhor extending
existing ones.18 8 The Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e start with
the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions
which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule."1 8 9 Therefore, selective
denial of "every man's evidence" should be narrowly construed.190
Furthermore, the government has the same tools to access
information from corporations as any private citizen-if not
more. 191 Thus, in addition to a lack of justification and necessary
elements of other privileges, the advent of a governmentinvestigatory privilege would unfairly advantage one party by
the hand of the judicial system itself.
C

Proposed FederalRule of Evidence 502 Ignores the CommonLaw History of Privileges

The Federal Advisory Committee has attempted to
circumvent the common law process by including the selective
waiver doctrine in Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502. Prior
to the proposal of Rule 502, the selective waiver doctrine had
been rejected by most circuit courts. 192 At a hearing on the
proposed rule, a representative from the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America argued, "[T]his committee seems to be telling
186 See Tiffany Seeman, Comment, Safeguarding the Attorney-Client Privilege in

the Face of Federal Securities Regulations, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 309, 337-38
(2006) (noting the Sixth Circuit's argument that the selective waiver rule is unfair to
private litigants who would be barred from information selectively released to the
government).
187 See id. at 338 ('Thus, the private plaintiff is in no worse position than if no
disclosure had been made.").
188 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
189 Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
190 See id.

191 The Eighth Circuit explained the ways in which litigants can gain
information from companies. See Diversified Indus., Inc., v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Due to the daunting task of securing information from
corporate settings, see Alexander, supra note 16, at 228-32, the government
probably has a greater chance of obtaining information when employing the same
tactics as private litigants because of its vast resources.
192 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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24 federal appellate judges from eight different circuits that their
With all due respect, it's not the
decisions were wrong.
committee's place, nor should the committee be trying to
undermine well settled law." 193 Additionally, a closer look at the
other provisions of Proposed Rule 502 reveals that their
underlying purposes promote the attorney-client privilege, which
194
is not also reflected by the selective waiver doctrine's purpose.
Most importantly, the recognition of a governmentinvestigatory privilege or the selective waiver provision of
Proposed Rule 502 would distort the purpose and the historically
narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege. Instead of
allowing corporations to cooperate with the government, this socalled privilege would allow guilty parties to ameliorate their
criminal sanctions from the government while escaping possible
exposure to liability from innocent third parties-a "having their
cake and eating it too" effect-by using the attorney-client
privilege to the corporations' advantage inside and outside the
courtroom.
Additionally, far from the concrete protection of the attorneyclient privilege, a government-investigatory privilege would
create no logical stopping point as to what the government could
Fishing expeditions by the
request from corporations. 195
would
be unstoppable without the
into
corporations
government
certainty of the attorney-client privilege.' 96 As a result, hundreds
of years of strict construction of the attorney-client privilege
would become distorted. One attendee of the Federal Advisory
Committee meeting on Proposed Rule 502 noted that he could not
193 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, at 49 (Apr. 24,
2006),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/EV -hearing.April_
2006.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (transcript from hearing at Fordham University

School of Law).
194 The other provisions support the purpose of the attorney-client privilege by
promoting "open and frank" conversation between client and attorney, which further
nurtures the relationship. In the least, the other provisions deal specifically with the
direct attorney-client relationship. These provisions include: scope of waiver;
inadvertent disclosure; controlling effect of court orders; controlling effect of party
agreements; and included privilege and protection. FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed
Draft 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
195 See Hearing, supra note 193, at 15. "Any pretense of request for waiver [by
the government] being infrequent would be lost, and such requests would become
item one in the play book of regulators and enforcement agencies ... [which] would
be impossible to resist .. " Id.
196 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege must be certain and predictable to those involved).
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"conceive of a set of circumstances where an American
corporation could ever effectively resist the government's request
or suggestion that waiver must be accommodated."' 19 7 In essence,
the attorney-client privilege would become both a weapon in
litigation and a useless form of protection for corporations in the
face of requests for privileged communications by the
government.
CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege's steely protection of privileged
communication morphs into nothing more than a symbolic
gesture for corporations' misuse when faced with the selective
waiver doctrine. Courts recognize few privileges because of their
drastic exclusion of evidence from the truth-seeking process. The
privileges that are recognized must be firmly upheld and
narrowly construed to provide certainty and predictability to all
litigants. Yet, the very word "selective" opposes this very basic
principle.
And when a corporation "selectively waives" its
attorney-client privilege, the corporation throws the law of
privileges into chaos by using the privilege as a weapon, not a
common right. Although the attorney-client privilege protects
qualified communications from disclosure, it is either an all-ornone proposition.
Furthermore, the public policy rationale of the selective
waiver doctrine cannot be squared with the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege. In fact, as a separate governmentinvestigatory privilege, the selective waiver doctrine does not
meet the qualifications of past privileges. All circuit courts of
appeals except for one faced with the issue of recognizing
selective waiver have rejected the doctrine. And, common law
has always ruled privileges. Therefore, the courts and Congress
should not recognize the doctrine in common law or the Federal
Rules of Evidence because it distorts the basis of not only
privileges, but also the judicial system. In the end, the judiciary
is based on seeking the truth for all-not just the government.

197

See Hearing, supra note 193, at 41.

